The introduction of in vitro fertilization in 1978 provoked a broad debate about the ethical prob- lems of technological intervention on the human reproduction. It is obvious, that the issue of whether the human embryo is or is not a person seems to be most important in current debates on the morality of selected abortion, cryopreservation and embryo experimentation. The seeking of the moral status of embryo addresses this fundamental question in a multidisciplinary manner. It is clear, that the philosophical or ontological approach to the embryo has a direct bearing upon a practical issues. This work deals with the moral status of embryo. The author claims, that we can establish his or her moral status by two different way. First it is a substantial approach. Then the embryo is the person since the conception. Second is the historical approach. Then the person is a concept of human being, that is unintelligible apart from social and historical context. But when we are not sure whether embryo is a person or not, it is wise to treat the embryo like a person.

        Key words: ontological personalism, empirical functionalism, embryo, human being, moral status, artificial reproduction.